Catch Them If You Can: An Evaluation of Archival Security Practices in New England by Greene, Katherine R.
 
Katherine R. Greene. Catch Them If You Can: An Evaluation of Archival Security 
Practices in New England. A Master’s Paper for the M.S. in L.S degree. April, 2021. 83 
pages. Advisor: Helen Tibbo. 
This study explores how archivists working at New England repositories perceive the 
Association of College and Research Libraries/Rare Books and Manuscripts Section 
Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections. Ten archivists 
representing nine repositories were interviewed and asked about if and how they use the 
Guidelines to inform their security policies, and were asked their opinion on the efficacy 
and practicality of each recommendation. Leading museum and library security 
consultant Steve Keller, of Steve Keller and Associates, was also interviewed to share his 
opinion of the Guidelines as a security professional. The findings indicated that while 
New England archivists view the recommendations individually as adequate security 
measures, their adoptability falls short. Additionally, there was a tendency among 
archivists at small repositories to feel that the Guidelines do not apply to them because 




Archive security measures 
Cultural property 
Library special collections 
Rare book libraries 
CATCH THEM IF YOU CAN: AN EVALUATION OF ARCHIVAL SECURITY 
PRACTICES IN NEW ENGLAND 
by 
Katherine R. Greene 
A Master’s paper submitted to the faculty 
of the School of Information and Library Science 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in 
Library Science. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 






Table of Contents 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3 
Literature Review................................................................................................................ 6 
Balancing Accessibility and Security ......................................................................... 6 
Security and Theft in Archives ................................................................................... 7 
Professional Opinion ................................................................................................... 8 
Archival Security in Practice .................................................................................... 11 
Recent Thefts ............................................................................................................ 12 
Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 15 
Data Collection Methods .......................................................................................... 16 
Data Analysis Methods ............................................................................................. 18 
Confidentiality .......................................................................................................... 18 
Are the Guidelines Worth Following? .............................................................................. 20 
Findings............................................................................................................................. 27 
Awareness of the Guidelines .................................................................................... 28 
Guideline 1: Library Security Officer ....................................................................... 28 
Guideline 2: Security Policy ..................................................................................... 29 
Guideline 3: Facility ................................................................................................. 30 
Guideline 4: Staff ...................................................................................................... 32 
2 
Guideline 5: Researchers .......................................................................................... 33 
Guideline 6: Classrooms ........................................................................................... 37 
Guideline 7: Collections ........................................................................................... 38 
Guideline 8: Record-Keeping ................................................................................... 40 
Guideline 9: Legal Responsibilities .......................................................................... 41 
Guideline 10: Institutional Support ........................................................................... 42 
Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 44 
The Assumption Made in the Guidelines .................................................................. 44 
Small Repositories Need Security, Too .................................................................... 46 
What Should a Good Security Policy Do? ................................................................ 48 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 52 
References ......................................................................................................................... 55 
Appendix A. ACRL/RBMS Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special 
Collections ........................................................................................................................ 60 
Appendix B. Listserv Recruitment Message .................................................................... 75 
Appendix C. Personalized Recruitment Message ............................................................. 76 





 During an insurance appraisal in April 2017 at the Carnegie Library in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, librarians became aware that around 300 items were missing from the R. 
Oliver Special Collections Room. Among the missing materials were a journal written by 
George Washington, a copy of Isaac Newton’s “Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica,” a seventeenth-century Bible, and a nineteenth-century atlas worth over 
one million dollars alone (Epstein, 2020). In total, the value of the missing items 
amounted to more than eight million dollars (Ward, 2020). After locating one million 
dollars’ worth – which were found as close as a rare book store a few blocks from the 
library and at least as far as the Netherlands – investigators determined that two men had 
been slowly removing books and maps for a period of 20 years (Stanley-Becker, 2018). 
Gregory Priore had been the sole archivist in the Oliver Room at the Carnegie Library 
since 1992, and as early as 1997 began stealing materials for John Schulman, a “titan in 
the book community,” to sell (Epstein, 2020; Stanley-Becker, 2018, para. 6). In July 
2018, they were charged with theft, conspiracy, forgery, receiving stolen items, and other 
crimes related to the removal of 320 items and the destruction of an additional 16 
(Stanley-Becker, 2018). According to Isaac Stanley-Becker of the Washington Post, 
Priore and Schulman “‘cannibalized’ the collection” (Stanley-Becker, 2018, para. 4). 
Priore stamped materials he stole as ‘withdrawn’ to give them an air of legitimacy; for 
items that were too large to sneak out in their entirety, he used a knife to remove the most 
valuable pages (Stanley-Becker, 2018). In June 2020, Schulman was sentenced to four 
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years of home confinement, 12 years of probation, and $55,731 in restitution, while 
Priore was sentenced to three years of home confinement and 12 years of probation; the 
presiding judge explained that while under normal circumstances he would have ordered 
jail time, he chose an alternate judgment due to the then-ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
(Levenson, 2020). The Carnegie Library has denounced these sentences and prosecutors 
continue to push for harsher punishments to reflect the conspiracy’s quite possible status 
as the “largest antique book art theft in the world” (Davidson & Bauder, 2020, para. 3). 
 Theft is a long-standing problem in the archival field about which relatively little 
has been done. Every few years, dramatic tales of greed and disrespect for cultural 
heritage reach major news outlets, interspersed with dozens of smaller cases not worthy 
of the status of breaking news, and concealing untold numbers of crimes that are never 
reported at all. When museum or archival theft does reach mainstream news, it is 
generally taken “lightly” as victimless entertainment rather than true crime (Allen, 1997, 
p. 37). Shortly after, articles will appear in scholarly journals condemning the thieves and 
crying out for security reform with recycled policy suggestions that are rarely 
implemented. Theft, like many disasters, is often considered an impossibility, or such an 
unlikelihood that an archivist believes his or her time is better spent completing other 
necessary tasks (Allen, 1997). It is exactly this attitude, however, that propagates the 
apparently endless cycle of crime, call for reform, lack of reform, and crime again. 
Furthermore, ideals of accessibility that do not take into account the historic and valuable 
nature of many archival collections create environments that practically welcome thieves. 
Theft is a taboo subject in the archival field, because to acknowledge it implies an 
acknowledgement also that collections may not be cared for as well as they should be. 
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Many institutions, after realizing they have been victims, refuse to report the crime; 
others, when law enforcement agencies recover materials that have been stolen, refuse to 
claim them to avoid publicly admitting that they had been stolen in the first place 
(Finnegan, 2005; Mason, 1975). According to the actions of institutions put in this 
position, the negative publicity and potential distrust from future donors outweighs the 
return of stolen items.  
This research study was based on the Association of College and Research 
Libraries/Rare Books and Manuscripts Section Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft 
in Special Collections. The purpose was to evaluate if these best practices are used to 
influence policies in New England archives and the degree of adherence among different 
repositories. Participants were asked their opinions on the efficacy in preventing or 
deterring theft and the practicality of implementation at their archive for each individual 
recommendation, as well as the Guidelines overall. 
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Literature Review 
Balancing Accessibility and Security 
Historical materials are valuable in many ways, two of which are evidential and 
monetary. These values at times oppose each other: evidence is the most useful when it is 
accessible while something of monetary value is the most protected when it is locked 
away. Archives must not only balance this dichotomy, but also prioritize access above 
most else. Traditionally, archival institutions have been closed to the general public, 
restricted to only the most elite academics, and intimidating to outsiders. Over recent 
decades, the field has worked hard to reimagine archives as public learning spaces for all 
demographics (Battin, 1990). This trend toward accessibility – while vital – has 
increasingly come at the detriment of overall collection security, the crux being that use 
of materials and access to pieces of cultural heritage must not be discouraged or 
prevented (Kovarsky, 2007). Many librarians discover their affinity for the profession by 
browsing the stacks, and archivists are no different; to prevent people from exploring 
archives may be to gatekeep the entire field. But common-sense security policies are also 
being suppressed in the name of accessibility, such as requiring visitors to remove 
outerwear before entering reading rooms. The director of the special collections library 
who eliminated that rule justified that such “increasingly intrusive security measures” 
discourage use (Kovarsky, 2007, para. 16). 
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Security and Theft in Archives 
In the mid-twentieth century, archives were highly restricted; visitors were 
required to submit their credentials and letters of introduction, sit through an interview 
with an archivist before being allowed to see anything, and limited in terms of how many 
materials they could request to see at once. Materials themselves were held in locked 
shelves only accessible by an archivist (Wyly, 1987). While institutions have always been 
loath to publicly reveal when they have been the victims of theft, crime was “neither a 
burning issue nor a trend” in contemporary literature, which suggests that it truly was not 
a pressing concern (Wyly, 1987, p. 241). According to Mary Wyly, however, ideological 
and logistical changes even by the late 1980s had resulted in archives being a prime 
target for theft, and her noted trends have only continued (Wyly, 1987). More private 
collections are being donated to or incorporated into archives and special collections 
repositories, reducing the size of the legitimate market and increasing prices of rare 
materials. Students at all levels are now encouraged to seek out primary sources rather 
than rely on textbooks alone, bringing new and more visitors to archives than ever before. 
To keep up with greater demand and to incorporate the field’s burgeoning accessibility 
ideals, many archives’ security policies were relaxed, and some aspects were removed 
entirely. 
By the mid-1990s, archival theft had become a noticeable problem. Because many 
repositories had no active record of what was in their collection, it was nearly impossible 
to truly know if materials had been stolen and for how long they had been gone. For too 
long, many attitudes toward theft in archives were the same as in lending libraries: it is 
unfortunate, but it happens; it cannot be that bad. In 1994, Sydney Van Nort and other 
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scholars encouraged attitudes to change by loudly reminding professionals in the field 
that most archival materials, unlike library books, cannot be replaced if they are stolen 
(Van Nort, 1994). While public and private repositories and professional organizations 
had been creating and publishing their own suggestions for collections safety with little 
impact, the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL)’s Rare Books and 
Manuscripts Section (RBMS) published their Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in 
Special Collections in 1988 that came to define archival security (Van Nort, 1994).  
As a result of the apparent increase in theft cases over the 1980s and 90s, the 
RBMS upgraded their ad hoc security committee to one with full organizational standing 
(Allen, 1997). One of their earliest projects was to produce Guidelines Regarding Theft 
in Libraries in 1982, which was followed shortly after by the more specific Guidelines for 
the Security of Rare Books, Manuscripts, and Other Special Collections. In 1988, both 
sets of guidelines were replaced by the current Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft 
in Special Collections (revised in 2009 and 2019). In 2012, the Society of American 
Archivists’ Security Section unanimously endorsed the Guidelines for all archivists. The 
RBMS committee gathered policy ideas from institutional security plans and suggestions 
presented in archival literature, and compiled resources on proactive measures to curb 
theft and proper responses after thefts have occurred. Although the content was not 
necessarily ground-breaking, presenting it in one place and attaching it to a professional 
organization gave the Guidelines the authority to create a standard for archival security.  
Professional Opinion 
In spite of the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines, many archivists still have their own 
ideas regarding how best to protect the collections in their care. In 1997, Susan Allen 
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suggested maintaining frequently-updated resources that would keep track of materials in 
a collection and conducting regular inventories to verify that items were in their correct 
locations. These efforts would both create a record of ownership and alert staff to when 
materials are stolen in a short amount of time. Allen also favored the elimination of 
processing backlogs, as most archivists certainly do, but again for the purpose of 
establishing proof of ownership. Additionally, the responsible hiring of staff and 
management of the archive was noted as an important practice, to ensure control and 
reduce the risk of insider theft. For archival repositories within lending libraries, Allen 
encouraged periodically evaluating circulating content to identify any rare or otherwise 
vulnerable items that may belong in the archive (Allen, 1997). 
Employee screening, access control, marking, publicity, consistency, and 
intellectual control were suggested by Ross Griffiths and Andrew Krol in 2009 to 
specifically target insider theft. Employee screening can be effective in two ways: hiring 
committees can identify and evaluate warning signs – such as fraudulent resumés, poor or 
no references, and unexplained terminations – before offering a position, and potential 
hires feel a sense of accountability and may take more care to obey rules. Controlling 
access to important spaces helps limit the presence of unnecessary staff and potential 
thieves; intellectual control refers to having an understanding of what materials are for 
the purpose of recognizing theft risk and to identify when they are missing. The marking 
of materials, with an ink stamp or some other tool, is a controversial but effective means 
of ensuring stolen materials, if recovered, are returned to the correct repository (Allen, 
1997; Kovarsky, 2007; Griffiths & Krol, 2009). The archival field must set a new 
standard of transparency in reporting crime; although reporting cases of theft may result 
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in negative publicity and tarnish a repository’s reputation temporarily, it should be 
viewed as a proactive measure toward preventing future crime and a recommitment to 
collection security. 
J.G. Speck argued in 2010 that prosecuting thefts should become general policy 
among archival repositories. Further, he pushed for sentencing reform to require harsher 
punishments for the theft or destruction of historical materials. Dubbed “cultural heritage 
crimes” by Travis McDade in 2008, Speck was not the first to put forth such an argument 
(McDade, 2008a, 2008b; Neff, 2010). McDade explained that cultural heritage crimes 
deserve to be treated harsher than thefts of other items because it is impossible to assign a 
true monetary value to historical items (McDade, 2008b). Beyond that, the loss of future 
knowledge a stolen or destroyed item may have provided is incalculable. Cultural 
heritage materials do not belong to any one repository, but to the society that created 
them, and the world that can learn from them; to steal such an item is to steal not from 
one institution, but the whole world. Speck reasoned that harsher sentences would both 
deter future crime and symbolize the profession’s shift toward improving collections 
security, and that archivists’ advocacy would be integral to bringing the reform to 
fruition; indeed, if archivists did not value their collections, no one else would (Speck, 
2010). While all of these proactive and penal measures would offer a higher level of 
security to any archive that adopts them, there are far too many to try to adopt them all. 
Additionally, with so much variety in security practices, it is impossible to know what 
policies and combinations of measures are truly effective in preventing theft. For these 
reasons, the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines, which espouse many of these individual 
measures, are the best standard to use. 
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Archival Security in Practice 
 In 1973, the Burns Security Institute conducted a survey of 255 libraries 
(including archives and special collections) across 39 states and found that “a great 
majority” of respondents believed library theft was worse than it have been five years 
before (National Survey on Library Security, 1973, p. 2). Despite this, “[a]lmost half” 
reported not having alarm systems and other common security equipment (National 
Survey on Library Security, 1973, p. 2). In a 1993 survey of thirteen member archives of 
a research network in Wisconsin, Vincent Totka Jr. found that none of the respondents 
had a written security policy (Totka, 1993). Most participating archives did not 
consistently require users to identify themselves before requesting materials, prohibit 
bringing personal containers or other items into the reading room, or even supervise the 
use of materials (Totka, 1993). The most telling finding, however, was an overall “lack of 
awareness and concern about the importance of theft prevention” (Totka, 1993, p. 668).  
In the current century, Abigail Martin surveyed 94 archivists in 2000 to evaluate 
the impact of Timothy Walch’s 1977 security manual and related literature. Less than 
one-third of respondents reported having a written security policy, and Martin concluded 
that the primary cause for archives to develop one is knowledge of a recent theft (Martin, 
2000). Some “Walchian principles” were found to have become relatively common 
practice (Martin, 2000, p. 12). Researchers were required to provide identification at a 
majority of responding archives, and at least some were subjected to an interview or 
orientation session almost 90 percent of the time. Most archives also reported copying 
materials for patrons, supervising reading rooms at all times, prohibiting personal items 
in reading rooms, recording patron requests and keeping those records indefinitely, and 
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reviewing folders and boxes after they had been used by a researcher. Less positively, 
many respondents were shocked by a question that implied they should re-inventory their 
collections and evaluate physical items and their descriptions in finding aids. 
Interestingly, although few practical differences were found between institutions that did 
and did not have written security policies, those with written policies were more likely to 
discover internally that a theft had occurred, while those without were more likely to be 
alerted to a theft from law enforcement. 
Michael and Patricia Mounce surveyed 78 special collections libraries in 2012 
and based their questionnaire on the ACRL’s Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in 
Special Collections. A slight majority of respondents reported being aware of the 
ACRL/RBMS Guidelines; of that slight majority, participants ranged from believing the 
Guidelines were “very important” to “very unimportant” (Mounce & Mounce, 2012, p. 
106). All in all, respondents viewed “the balance between making materials available to 
researchers and ensuring the security of the materials” as the most important security 
measure (Mounce & Mounce, 2012, p. 106). When asked to evaluate the level of 
importance of six specific security measures and report whether or not their repository 
utilized any of them, at least 77 percent judged each measure to be somewhat or very 
important, while as few as 15.5 percent reported utilizing them (Mounce & Mounce, 
2012). This appears to be representative of the general feeling among archival 
professionals today: security is important, but it is not a priority. 
Recent Thefts 
Theft, and disasters more broadly, is something most people think will never 
happen to them. That is why it is so easy to ignore repository security to make time for 
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more day-to-day tasks. However, this is a cavalier attitude given that once archival 
materials are gone, they cannot be replaced and are not always recovered; the 
aforementioned Carnegie Library case is not the only recent example of theft. In April 
2018, French historian Antonin DeHays was sentenced to one year in prison, three years 
of probation, and 100 hours of community service for stealing at least 291 World War II-
era dog tags and at least 134 records, including personal correspondence, photographs, 
and aircraft fragments from the National Archives and Records Administration in 
Maryland (Cox, 2017; McFadden, 2018). The artifacts were stolen between 2012 and 
2017; most were sold on eBay and other online auction sites for a total of more than 
$43,000. One dog tag was donated to a museum in exchange for the opportunity to sit in 
a Spitfire airplane. Some of the stolen items have not been recovered (Missing World 
War II Identification Tags and Related Items, 2019). In February 2019, Kevin Mark 
Ronald Schuwer was sentenced to 120 days in jail, three years of probation, and a $900 
fine for stealing eight rare books from the Harold B. Lee Library at Brigham Young 
University, his alma mater (Man Sentenced to 120 Days in Jail for Stealing LDS 
Artifacts, 2019). He was also accused of stealing photographs and other artifacts from 
similar repositories and selling counterfeit rare materials. 
DeHays is not the only thief to target World War II materials from the National 
Archives. In January 2020, Robert Rumsby, a sergeant in the National Guard, was 
convicted for stealing at least four World War II dog tags in 2011 to give to soldiers’ 
relatives; Rumsby believed he was doing the right thing by “tak[ing] ownership” of the 
artifacts (Thayer, 2019, para. 6). He was sentenced to only 18 months of probation and a 
$5,000 fine, which was expected to “promote respect for the law” and “serve as a 
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deterrent” from stealing America’s “national treasures” (Kunzelman, 2020, para. 4). In 
June 2020, a former University of Illinois employee was sentenced to two years of 
probation and 30 hours of community service for spitefully stealing at least two rare 
musical books from the University’s Music and Performing Arts Library (Ex-University 
Employee Gets Probation for Rare Book Theft, 2020). Thomas McGeary believed the 
University had “wronged him” and sold the books for financial gain (Ex-University 
Employee Gets Probation for Rare Book Theft, 2020, para. 2). Archival theft should 
clearly be recognized as a current and pressing concern; this study will evaluate the 
current iteration of the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines in an effort to determine whether they 
are being used by archival professionals in New England, and if not, the factors that 
prevent them from being implemented. Moreover, current archival security policies will 
be identified for the first time in nearly a decade, and specifically in New England for the 
first time ever.
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Methodology 
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to understand the current state of 
security policies in New England archives. Specifically, it evaluated how the 
ACRL/RBMS Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections are 
utilized in practice. This study focused only on Part I of the Guidelines, titled “Security 
Measures,” and did not include Part II, “Responses to Theft” (the text of the Guidelines 
under review can be found in Appendix A). The central question for this research was as 
follows: Do archivists in New England use the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines to help them 
protect their collections? Further guiding the study were the following sub-questions: 1) 
Do New England archivists feel the Guidelines are adequate and effective security 
measures; 2) How closely do their repositories follow the Guidelines; and 3) How does 
adherence to the Guidelines differ among a variety of repositories? 
 The Society of American Archivists defines security as “measures taken to protect 
materials from unauthorized access, change, destruction, or other threats” (SAA 
Dictionary: Security, n.d.). This definition must be revised for this study in two ways; 
first, only the security of physical materials will be considered, because to attempt to 
combine physical and digital security in a single master’s paper would be a disservice to 
both topics. Second, the “other threat” that this study will specifically examine is the 
taking without permission, i.e., theft or stealing, of materials. New England must also be 
defined as the geographic region comprised of the six northeastern-most states in the 
United States: Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and 
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Maine. The names of participants and institutions have been kept confidential to protect 
their reputations and security policies; instead, repositories were assigned an identifier 
composed of a size classification and a number. The distinction of small or large was 
applied to repositories by participants; archivists were encouraged to consider the number 
of physical items in their repository’s collection as well as the availability of financial 
and other resources that could affect implementation of a security policy. This decision 
was made in deference to standard practice when classifying the size of an archive: that 
institutions themselves make an argument for their being viewed as small or large. For 
example, the Institute of Museum and Library Services’ 2019 Accelerating Promising 
Practices for Small Libraries grant program asked potential applicants to “consider how 
their organization might be a good fit” in light of the fact that “[t]here are a number of 
ways to be ‘small’” (Calling Small Libraries, 2019, para. 6). If number ranges were 
assigned to each size class, one insignificant item could cause an archive to enter the next 
category while having no other impact on the repository; furthermore, as the grant 
application suggests, there are many ways in which an institution can be considered small 
or large, including the number of staff, budget and income, range of services provided, 
and the size of community served (Calling Small Libraries, 2019). 
Data Collection Methods 
Participants were recruited via a convenience sample based upon the membership 
body of the regional professional organization, New England Archivists. There were 521 
members at the time of sampling, but this does not accurately reflect the number of 
eligible archivists for five reasons: first, some members were affiliated with repositories 
outside this study’s definition of New England and therefore were ineligible to 
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participate; second, some members were graduate students and not professional 
archivists, making them also ineligible; third, individuals with individual or lifetime 
memberships may have been retired archivists and no longer employed at the institution 
listed in the directory; fourth, members with the same institutional affiliation may not all 
be qualified to speak about their repository’s security policies; and fifth, not all members 
were archivists. These limitations restrict the pool of eligible members to considerably 
fewer than the full directory. 
A call for participation was sent to the announcements listserv that directed 
interested archivists to contact the researcher for more information (see Appendix B for 
the text of this message). Four archivists, representing three repositories, responded to the 
listserv message, and three archivists (representing two repositories) consented to be 
interviewed. Because of the sensitive nature of archival theft and the depth of this study 
into individual repositories’ security practices, it was expected that the general 
recruitment message would not be particularly successful. Personalized recruitment e-
mails were sent to eligible archivists who included their contact information and 
institutional affiliation in the membership directory (see Appendix C for the text of this 
message). In total, 28 archivists responded to personalized e-mails, but only six agreed to 
an interview. While this sampling method does not result in generalizable data, that was 
not the goal of this research; the purpose of this study was to learn the perspectives of 
individual archivists on security and their use of the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines, not to 
generalize their experience. 
Archivists participated in virtual, semi-structured interviews due to geographical 
constraints and COVID-19 travel and gathering restrictions. They were requested to use 
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cameras to enable video interviews; this was intended to forge a relationship and develop 
a sense of trust between themselves and the researcher that could have been diminished 
or lost in the absence of an in-person conversation. Archivists were sent a list of 
questions before the interview to allow them to review relevant policies or consider their 
responses in advance (these questions can be found in Appendix D). The duration of 
interviews ranged from approximately 20 minutes to one hour, depending upon the 
availability of the participant and if additional questions or clarifications were warranted.  
Data Analysis Methods 
Each interview was recorded to enable the researcher to create a transcript that 
would be used for analysis. Transcriptions were created using the online transcription 
generator, Otter, which the researcher subsequently reviewed for accuracy. Codes were 
applied to analyze the data, and included whether or not each guideline was implemented, 
how it was or why it was not implemented, how the participant viewed a guideline’s 
efficacy and practicality, and how the participant thought about security, accessibility, 
and other archival principles. Annotations were also applied to identify quotable remarks. 
Confidentiality 
The most important concern during the data collection and analysis processes was 
maintaining participant confidentiality, especially because of the geographically-limited 
sample size. For this purpose, interview recordings were deleted once the transcription 
was completed, transcriptions were deleted once the study was completed, and a 
document connecting participant and repository identifiers with names and locations was 
also deleted after completion of the study. Upon consenting to an interview, e-mail 
communication from the researcher to a participant was encrypted and sent with the 
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highest sensitivity level. Recording and transcription files were saved using numerical 
identifiers assigned to each participant (1001, 1002, and so on), but the researcher chose 
to use repository-based identifiers (Large Repository 1, Small Repository 2, and so on) in 
this paper to place focus on institutions rather than individual archivists. Additionally, 
participants were sent excerpts of the written findings in which they were quoted or their 
repository was mentioned before this paper was published to give them an opportunity to 
approve or request revisions based upon identifiability concerns.
  20 
Are the Guidelines Worth Following? 
Steve Keller and Associates, Inc. is the leading security consulting firm in the 
United States that almost exclusively serves museums, archives, and other cultural 
properties internationally. Headquartered in Florida, they work both directly with 
institutional leaders seeking to improve their security practices and architects during 
renovation projects at cultural properties for clients that include the Library of Congress, 
the National Gallery of London, and the Musée Toulouse-Lautrec in France. Keller began 
his career as an officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. in 
1969 before becoming an Assistant Director of Security at the Federal Reserve Board in 
1974 and a Director of Corporate Security at a private company in 1978. He entered the 
museum security field in 1979 as an Executive Director of Protection Services at the Art 
Institute of Chicago and began his consulting career in 1986. Keller recalled that it took 
time to break into the library field because “their priority…was not…security,” and what 
professionals they did rely upon did not have “as solid a background [in security] as it 
could have been.” Now, a considerable portion of his clients are libraries and archives, 
for whom he typically conducts “initial surveys” to look for “general vulnerabilities,” 
such as if a patron could simply lean across a staff desk and reach materials waiting to be 
re-shelved. After this survey, Keller is often hired to implement whatever changes he 
recommends to address the identified vulnerabilities. He uses the ACRL/RBMS 
Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections – adapted in part from a 
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set of best practices he wrote for museums in the early 1990s – to form a baseline for his 
recommendations. 
Of the first guideline, stipulating that archives employ a library security officer, 
Keller agrees that “[t]here absolutely has to be somebody responsible for 
security…there’s no question about it.” He “disagree[s] strongly” with the idea that a 
group of people can share responsibility for repository security, saying plainly that 
“people won’t do what they’re supposed to do unless they’re the one that gets hung up to 
dry when there’s a problem.” Multiple repositories within one organization may – and 
ideally should – each have their own security officer, but there ought to be “one person 
over top of that” whose responsibility it is to “coordinate” efforts. He also supports the 
second guideline, which encourages archives to have a formal, overarching security 
policy, to achieve “some [amount of] standardization” for staff to enforce and patrons to 
follow. It is important, however, for policies to be revisited often enough to remain 
relevant, and Keller recommends this happen every 18 months to two years, or anytime a 
“significant omission” is identified, by a library security officer with input from all 
relevant staff. 
The third guideline shifts to consider an archive’s physical space, and 
recommends establishing staff-only areas and limiting unnecessary staff access, offering 
secure spaces for patrons to leave personal items, and installing alarm systems and 
security cameras. According to Keller, simply recommending that archives have alarm 
systems is not entirely helpful, and there are external factors to be aware of when 
determining what kind of system to purchase. For example, institutions located in regions 
where natural disasters can result in extended power losses may deem extended battery 
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backups to be important investments. Institutions should identify a reputable central 
station to provide constant monitoring and other protective services (academic 
repositories may also have secondary monitoring by campus safety, but should first rely 
on the central station). There is also no guidance for what kind of cameras are ideal or 
where they should be located throughout the repository. Keller explained that “a lot of 
fixed cameras” are “more useful” than a single camera that can rotate around a room 
because, in his experience, moving cameras are “always looking the wrong way when 
something happens.” Cameras are most effective in the reading room, focused on points 
of entry and everywhere researchers may be using materials. Certain tables best observed 
by cameras should be reserved for researchers working with high-value items. 
The fourth guideline concerns staff and is focused both on suggesting policies to 
prevent insider theft as well as equipping staff with policies to protect collections from 
external thieves; Keller approves of all the suggested measures, including training on 
institutional security policies, regularly evaluating staff performance, and conducting 
background checks on potential hires. He suggested, however, that staff also be trained 
“on the value of security, the importance of their job,” and “of the security portion of 
their job” if there is no library security officer. There is an “awareness” that should be 
taught such that when “just one of the ten tasks [an archivist has] to do is to…keep an eye 
on…the reading room,” it is understood that that supervision “is not the least important of 
those,” and in fact is “fairly important” (exactly how important may vary depending on 
the presence of security cameras, a security officer, and so on). Further, Keller explained 
that “theft can have a significant impact on the institution and on [archivists] personally,” 
and it is critical that staff recognize that their repository is “not implementing security 
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measures…because they’re suspects,” but to protect them from unnecessary suspicion. 
To that end, requiring background checks on new employees is not intended to prevent 
qualified people from being hired, but to enable institutions to know whom they are 
hiring. It was noted, however, that the guideline lacks clarity on “what an effective 
background check is.” In Keller’s consulting experience, typically only local (to the 
repository) records are requested from a county sheriff, but he recommends a “national 
check” to have a better understanding of a person’s history, even if they recently 
relocated. 
Researchers are the subject of the fifth guideline, which encourages registration 
requirements that include photo identification, limits on what personal items may be 
brought into the reading room, how much material researchers can have at once, constant 
supervision of patrons, and evaluating materials before and after use. Keller believes 
these measures “are exactly what’s needed,” and that although adhering to this guideline 
requires a significant resource investment – particularly the patron supervision and 
material evaluation components – “it’s all a matter of priorities.” He does argue, 
however, that evaluation as it is described and intended as a security practice, is neither 
practical nor realistic; instead, he recommends that specific, high-value items be 
reviewed when they are used, and externally identified by “a red sticker on the front of 
[their] box[es]” or something similarly visible to indicate their presence to staff. Well-
placed security cameras can be responsible for evaluating other materials, and footage 
can be reviewed as necessary. Some repositories hold class sessions in the reading room 
for students, and considerations for these groups of patrons are addressed in the sixth 
guideline. Keller maintained, as before, that consistent supervision while groups are in 
  24 
the archive and reviewing materials once they leave is pivotal for students who may not 
have “the maturity to understand the importance of the materials” they are working with. 
This may not be as pressing of a concern if the materials in question are large books or 
items that would be otherwise difficult to secret away, but Keller noted that small, easily-
concealed photographs are the most frequently stolen items. 
The seventh guideline details how institutions should document collections to be 
able to prove their ownership if an item appears on the market or is recovered by law 
enforcement, namely by marking items, creating detailed catalog records, and regularly 
updating condition reports. Bookplates are commonly used by librarians to indicate 
ownership of general collections, but special collections librarians and archivists often 
prefer a more subtle, less-invasive method. Microdots were widely used by spies during 
World War II and the Cold War to share images and documents the size of a punctuation 
mark; now, anyone shopping on Amazon or another mass-market retailer can purchase an 
affordable kit to discreetly mark thousands of possessions with a registered serial 
number. While it is unknown if microdots will remain stable for centuries or damage the 
paper underneath them like iron gall ink, Keller argues that to have a realistic chance of 
recovering a stolen item, “you’re going to have to mark it somehow.” He admits that 
there are certainly other ways of identification, but it is often prohibitively inefficient to 
manually describe items in the necessary amount of detail. The eighth guideline similarly 
focuses on documentation, but with the intent to maintain intellectual and physical 
control over collections by way of conducting inventories, updating shelf lists, and 
keeping records of deaccessions and unlocated items. Keller readily agrees that 
inventorying an entire repository is “a huge task,” but an important one that is worth 
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prioritizing; an inventory can serve multiple purposes – such as identifying preservation 
concerns and candidates for deaccession – making it more efficient. The size of a 
repository can dictate how often inventories are conducted or how to divide collections 
into manageable sections to inventory, but it is crucial to be able to pinpoint when an 
item goes missing as closely as possible. 
Dealing with suspicious patrons and reporting thefts are the subject of the ninth 
guideline; institutions should train staff to be able to safely confront a dubious researcher 
and commit to reporting thefts immediately after they occur or are discovered. Keller 
qualified that acting “suspicious is one thing,” and staff should observe that patron more 
carefully for the remainder of their time in the reading room; confrontation should be 
reserved for “if you see somebody conceal something” and can be more certain that a 
theft may be imminent. In his experience with mostly academic libraries, archivists 
promptly report thefts to their campus safety department but are often “less likely to want 
to make a report to the police.” Adherence to this guideline can also depend upon what 
materials have been stolen: if, during a consultation, evidence of a larger-scale theft was 
to be found, Keller commented that administrators are more resistant to the publicity that 
would accompany a police investigation. Ideally, of course, “they should report 
everything.” Institutions and administrators should also commit to supporting law 
enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of accused thieves, and this is the focus 
of the tenth and final guideline. According to Keller, this is “not generally spelled out in a 
security policy” but common sense hopefully dictates that institutions cooperate in the 
fullest capacity. 
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In summation, Keller believes the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines Regarding Security 
and Theft in Special Collections are valuable as a starting point for archivists looking to 
revise existing or establish new security policies and practices. He noted that individual 
recommendations “sometimes…are not well defined, or not very specific,” and the 
Guidelines as a whole lack the “distinction between ‘should’ and ‘shall’” that he devised 
for the original set of museum best practices. The distinction is an important one, 
however, because it indicates what measures are essential to keeping collections safe and 
what are ideal. In reality, he recognizes that implementing every best practice can be 
overwhelming for archivists, and advises his clients to “implement the low-hanging fruit” 
first and move forward from there according to the needs of their collections, staff, and 
patrons. Of all the archives and special collections libraries that Keller counts as former 
clients, the most common weakness has been leaving unprocessed materials completely 
unprotected when there may be high-value items that have not yet been cataloged; these 
are really the most vulnerable materials because if they were to be stolen, it would be 
almost impossible to know that they are missing, identify that they are on the market, or 
prove the repository’s ownership. He highlighted the employment of a library security 
officer – someone with knowledge of the best practices and the responsibility to 
implement them and oversee adherence – as the most important guideline for institutions 
to heed, and that navigating the paradox surrounding accessibility and security is a 
complex task that should be handled by archivists and security officers together.
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Findings 
In total, 10 archivists working in nine New England repositories were interviewed 
for this study. Of the nine archives, five are under the umbrella of academic libraries, two 
are local historical societies, one is under the umbrella of a public library, and one is an 
organizational archive. Eight of the archives were self-identified as small and only one 
archivist defined her repository as large. It was observed that securing the participation of 
archivists at large archives was much more challenging than securing the participation of 
their colleagues at small archives; a considerable majority of archivists who 
communicated with the researcher but ultimately declined to be interviewed were 
affiliated with institutions that would likely have been classified as large. Of those who 
declined to participate and provided a reason for their refusal, lack of availability for an 
interview and the discovery that their institutional security policy prevented them from 
speaking about security with someone outside of the institution were the most common 
explanations. It must also be remembered that the data collection period was between late 
2020 and early 2021, when exhaustion and burnout stemming from the COVID-19 
pandemic and remote working situations were at their most overwhelming, and this 
almost certainly affected the number of eligible archivists who were willing to participate 
in a research study. The small number of participants in relation to the sampling frame 
and the representation of only one large archive were both limitations in this study. 
Overall, because fewer archivists at large repositories were able to participate in this 
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study, the perspectives of archivists in small repositories dominated the findings and 
conclusions. 
Awareness of the Guidelines 
 Seven participants representing six archives reported being personally aware of 
the existence of the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines, but said they were not used to influence 
their repositories’ security policies. Archivists at Small Repositories 4, 6, and 8 had no 
knowledge of the Guidelines before learning about this study and could not comment on 
if or how they informed their repositories’ policies. 
Guideline 1: Library Security Officer 
None of the archives represented in this study have an employee whose job title is 
“Library Security Officer” or whose sole responsibility is security. Eight archivists 
representing seven archives do not have anyone who is responsible for collections 
security in any capacity; in fact, five of the eight commented that they are the closest 
thing to a security officer. An archivist at Small Repository 1 said that while her 
responsibilities include collections care and that she has worked to improve her 
repository’s security practices, security was not written into her job description. She 
commented that “there hasn’t been a perceived awareness” of security concerns among 
the leadership at her archive, despite the existence of “risks” over time, and that this 
hinders her ability to implement large-scale change, such as hiring or incorporating a 
Library Security Officer. At Small Repository 5, an archivist reflected that her written job 
description is so “vague that I’m in charge of everything to do with special collections,” 
but there is “nothing specific” to indicate responsibility for collections security, or what 
that might entail. At Large Repository 1, although no one is solely focused on it, there is 
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a staff member whose role includes collections security; the archivist noted that “anyone 
can be designated [as] the library security officer” and that it does not necessarily need to 
be an additional employee. She highlighted the importance of having someone 
responsible for security in the archive to “coordinate efforts” and “make sure that we’re 
covering all the bases” when thefts are discovered. 
Seven archivists believed the first guideline to be effective at preventing or 
deterring theft. An archivist at Small Repository 6 argued that while a Library Security 
Officer is effective “for a very large archive,” she did not think it would be effective or 
practical in a smaller repository. Three other archivists agreed that implementing this 
guideline would not be practical for their archive; one participant at Small Repository 8 
cited “staffing limitations” as the primary reason why it would be difficult to add an 
employee solely focused on security or incorporate such a responsibility into an existing 
employee’s workload. Two archivists at Small Repository 2 lamented that “we are our 
security force” and “are pretty much our own first and last line of defense” without much 
support from their institution.  
Guideline 2: Security Policy 
Only two archivists reported that their repository has a security policy that is 
focused specifically on the archives. An archivist at Small Repository 7 said his policy is 
revisited “every time the library-wide policies get updated,” but Small Repository 8 has 
no schedule for updating its policy. One archive within an academic library is covered by 
a policy that was “developed in concert with our campus security department” and is 
helpful for providing a response “framework,” but does not have specific consideration 
for the archive within the general library. Four archives have access and use policies that 
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address some security concerns, but there is no single policy to establish security 
practices. At Small Repository 1, there are “a couple of different documents that kind of 
address security of collections…but we don’t have a dedicated security policy.” The 
archivist noted her archive should “be very proactive in how we approach security” 
because there are “definitely things that if someone stole them, they can try to sell them 
[and] they would be successful.” The limiting factor, she observed, is that “it basically 
comes down to me and how I prioritize my resources [and] my time.” While the 
remaining two archives do have sets of practices that are intended to keep their 
collections secure, they are “not written down and codified in a meaningful way,” 
according to an archivist at Small Repository 2. 
All ten archivists believed that having a comprehensive security policy is an 
effective security measure. One participant said, however, that in order for an archive to 
develop one, “it definitely needs to have support from up top and recognition of the 
importance…of such a policy.” An archivist whose repository has policies that cover 
aspects of security but no comprehensive or independent archives security policy 
described herself as being “a big fan of having policies…before you need them” and 
suggested that security concerns can get lost when they are bundled into access and use 
policies. Conversely, the one archivist who found a security policy to be impractical for 
her archive felt that security was “covered sufficiently” in an access and use policy. 
Guideline 3: Facility 
Six archives are adapting spaces that were not originally intended to be archives, 
including former media centers and churches. The remaining three archives are in 
buildings which were intended to be repositories; however, even that may not be a perfect 
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match for the needs of the collections if the buildings are particularly old. Every archive 
limits its public entrances and collections storage spaces in some way, including 
differentiating public and staff-only areas and using alarm systems and locks that require 
physical keys, swipe cards, and number codes. At Small Repository 1, an archivist called 
attention to a lack of communication between archives staff and maintenance workers 
over a private loading entrance that also serves as the building’s only wheelchair-
accessible entrance: this door is expected to be locked at all times but maintenance staff 
occasionally share their access codes or leave it open for external maintenance workers, 
creating an obvious security risk. Large Repository 1 implements swipe card locks at 
staff entrances that limit the hours during which staff may enter and saves access records 
indefinitely. Five archives have installed security cameras that record at all times, but 
these are often aimed at public entrances or the staff side of reference or help desks and 
do not cover researchers in reading rooms or alternate entrances. While most archivists at 
repositories with security cameras did not know how long footage was saved for, it was 
typically assumed to be around one week. Every repository has areas for patrons to store 
personal items, but in some buildings this area is inside the reading room and therefore 
less effective at preventing thieves from smuggling items out in a bag or jacket. 
All ten archivists believed the facilities guideline to be effective. An archivist at 
Small Repository 8 said that while having security cameras may not “prevent” theft, they 
are at least “helpful for identifying what may have happened,” and an archivist at Large 
Repository 1 qualified that they are “effective deterrents.” Another archivist at Small 
Repository 2 added that cameras can “supplement what you’re losing” in other areas if 
some guidelines cannot be followed. Six archivists believed this guideline to be practical 
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for their repositories; the remaining four felt that their buildings are particularly unsuited 
for use as archives and they can only do so much to improve them. An archivist at Small 
Repository 1 noted the difficulty between “want[ing] to keep the building secure” while 
“want[ing] people to feel comfortable coming to visit,” and that limiting and controlling 
public access can intimidate patrons.  
Guideline 4: Staff 
 Every archivist believed their institution conducts background checks on new 
employees, but no archive with student workers extends the requirement to them. An 
archivist at Small Repository 1 described the purpose of background checks as not to 
prevent anyone with a criminal background from working at her organization, but to 
“draw the line” before hiring someone with a record of archival theft or a relevant crime. 
Every archive has a policy establishing a schedule for performance reviews, but it is not 
always followed; although Small Repository 2 requires a six-month “provisional” period 
for new staff in which they are reviewed every month, “there seems to be very spotty 
evaluation” after the provisional period is completed. Attempts to conduct regular 
evaluations have been tied to turnover among administrators and therefore have “waxed 
and waned” as the leadership has changed. The archivist noted that while “there are a lot 
of things that are…difficult to change,” “accountability is very important.” Six archives 
provide some form of security training for staff, but these trainings often do not fully 
adhere to the guideline. For example, security workshops at Small Repository 8 are 
tailored for “overall organizational security [and are] not specific to the archives.” There 
are more security training resources for staff at Small Repository 4, but the archivist 
explained that rather than theft prevention for the archives, the trainings applied to active 
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shooter and other emergency situations that may arise in the library. There was a feeling 
among several archivists working at repositories located within larger library settings best 
described by a participant at Small Repository 2: “I don’t think that anyone else would be 
enthused to have an entire workshop for the archives.” At Small Repository 1, the 
training process is much less formal and is only standard for new staff. Otherwise, the 
archivist explained, “if I come across something that I feel like is a weak area for us, and 
I identify a solution to that,” she will have “conversations with staff” about it. 
Almost every archivist agreed that the recommendations for staff are both 
effective and practical for their repositories. The one outlying participant cautioned that 
based on her perspective from working at two archives which experienced insider thefts 
during her employment, “if people are determined to do it, there’s a way to do it.” 
Historically, “larger and older institutions” operated according to a sort of “gentleman’s 
compact” that has given staff practically unlimited access to collections at all times, but 
this practice is changing as security is increasingly perceived as a legitimate concern. 
While limiting access to certain hours of the day and/or certain areas of the repository is 
truly for the “protection” of employees from unnecessary suspicion in the event of a theft, 
such changes can cause staff to feel unvalued by administrators and lay a path toward 
future theft. Beyond the policies suggested in the guideline, the outlying archivist argued 
that “having good staff morale, and having staff who feel understood and valued in their 
work, is really the best deterrent to insider theft.” 
Guideline 5: Researchers 
Six archives require researchers to register before they are allowed to access 
materials. Of these, one uses researcher registration for statistical purposes and only saves 
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information for one fiscal year before it is deleted. The information collected is limited to 
the patron’s “name, nature of [their] research question, and maybe some potential ideas 
of what they need access to.” Another repository included in the aforementioned six only 
requires patrons to provide their contact information if they are looking to use manuscript 
collections; users of other research materials need only sign-in via an informal sign-in 
sheet. An archivist at this institution explained that part of this policy is a result of “an 
ethos of really bending over backwards to give people access and…to go that extra mile 
[to make them feel] a lot more comfortable coming in.” Registration information is saved 
indefinitely while sign-in sheets are saved for one fiscal year. The most commonly-
collected information includes names, e-mail addresses, and research questions, and the 
typical retention period is indefinite. Only two repositories have a photo identification 
requirement as part of their registration process, and one of these repositories also 
requires researchers to have a reference interview with an archivist prior to accessing 
materials. Participants whose repositories do not require proof of identity stated a desire 
to “lower the barriers to access of our collections” and make patrons “feel comfortable 
coming in.” An archivist at one of the repositories with no registration requirement noted 
that this is a reflection of the ethics of her parent institution – a public library which also 
does not require any form of registration to borrow items. She described a belief that 
“there might be some pushback” from the greater library administration against 
implementing a registration requirement to use the archives because of the no-registration 
policy for the general collection. Six archives use call slips, documents that connect 
researchers to the materials they use, either completed by the researcher and submitted to 
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an archivist or by staff after the request is made. Four of these repositories keep call slips 
indefinitely. 
Eight archivists representing seven repositories reported that part of the 
registration process involves instructing researchers on reading room rules before they 
can use materials. Often, this instruction is included as part of the online or paper 
registration form, or is shared verbally when patrons are in the archive. Two archivists 
whose practices fall into the latter category commented that when the reading room is 
particularly busy, staff often do not have time to give a “spiel” about the rules of handling 
materials. Only one participant was confident that the orientation culminated in patrons 
signing an acknowledgment confirming their understanding of reading room policy. One 
of the archives has a policy for how to address researchers who fail to follow rules; 
several archivists at the remaining institutions responded that they had no experience with 
belligerent researchers who, after an initial reprimand, continued to misbehave. Typical 
reading room rules include limiting what personal items can be brought in, how much 
material can be pulled at once, and that researchers are always supervised by staff. All 
nine archives have areas where patrons can store prohibited personal items – usually 
coats, bags, umbrellas, ink-based writing utensils, food, and drinks – but in one building, 
the closet is located within the reading room rather than outside in a lobby. Six archives 
limit researchers to using one box at a time, but several archivists noted that “exceptions” 
can be made to this rule if another limit makes more sense. Two archives have no limit 
for the volume of materials that can be in use by a single patron at once, although one 
archivist noted that while there is no “real number” at her repository, “you know it when 
you see it.” One archive limits researchers to one file or folder at a time. While every 
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archivist was aware of the importance of supervision when patrons are using materials, 
only three were confident that it is truly constant; the remaining seven expressed that 
their level of supervision is “as [consistent] as we humanly can manage.” One archivist 
explained that the ability for staff to supervise researchers has largely to do with the 
physical space; archivists working in repurposed buildings often have a harder time of 
making the space work for them in such a way that allows them to observe the reading 
room and still complete their own work. Two archivists evaluate materials before they are 
used by researchers: the practice is inconsistent at Small Repository 5 but intended to 
“make sure…what you’re giving them is there” while at Large Repository 1 it is to 
identify fragile items that should not be handled. Two archivists evaluate materials after 
they are used by researchers: at Small Repository 4, the process is more like a “skim” 
through folders to ensure papers are in the correct order, and even more informal at Small 
Repository 8, where the archivist explained, “I know what’s in this box so I make sure 
everything goes back in the box.” 
All ten participants agreed that the recommendations for dealing with researchers 
in an archive are effective security measures. Three archivists at small repositories did 
not believe them to be practical for their repositories. One participant at an academic 
repository that sees mostly student researchers said, “any sort of formal registration is a 
barrier to entry for some of our users that we want to make it as easy as possible for.” He 
added that evaluating materials either before or after researcher use is not something “that 
had occurred to us [as necessary] to build into our protocol.” An archivist at Small 
Repository 8 believed that many of the suggestions in the researcher guideline – 
particularly creating call slips, constantly supervising researchers, and evaluating 
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materials – put too much demand on her repository’s already “limited staff and time” to 
implement comprehensively and consistently. 
Guideline 6: Classrooms 
Five archivists worked in repositories that had classroom spaces. Of those, only 
one requires class participants to use sign-in sheets and retains those documents 
indefinitely. Another tracks the number of participants but not their names, and the 
remaining three do not keep consistent records of participants because they are confident 
in their ability to reconstruct a roster if it became necessary. At Large Repository 1, 
archivists keep records to documenting the “faculty and teaching fellows” who bring 
groups in, and an archivist at Small Repository 7 collects participants’ names “when I can 
get them”; otherwise, there is a consensus best described by an archivist at Small 
Repository 8: “we figure if we needed a list of participants, we could contact the teacher 
who brought the class in.” Every archivist said they hold groups in the classroom to the 
same standard as researchers in the reading room, with the exception of one employed at 
a small repository who explained that due to a lack of storage space, participants are 
allowed to bring bags and coats into the reading room. Four archivists restrict groups to 
interacting only with materials specifically brought out for them by staff. At Small 
Repository 7, however, the archivist requires that “students wash their hands before they 
sit at a table, but we want them to have as broad of an exposure as possible,” and only 
limits participants from handling “super delicate” items. At Large Repository 1, an 
archivist said “preliminary review is more stringent” for materials that will be used in a 
group session than by an individual researcher, while two other archivists indicated that 
materials are only reviewed after a session. An archivist at Small Repository 3 described 
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that “oftentimes we have to re-shelve them so then they would be examined before 
they’re re-shelved.” At Repositories 7 and 8, there is merely an informal “once-over” 
with the thinking that “I brought out 20 items, I put 20 items back.” 
Of the five archivists whose repositories have classroom spaces and work with 
groups, all of them agreed that the classroom guideline is an effective measure to prevent 
or deter theft. An archivist at Small Repository 8 was the only participant who believed 
that the guideline is not practical for her institution, primarily because of “time and 
staffing issue[s]” that prohibit recording group members’ names and evaluating materials 
before and/or after a class session. She also echoed the observation of another archivist 
that it can be difficult to work in a building that was not intended to be an archive; in this 
instance, the challenge is embodied by the limited amount of storage space for personal 
items when large groups of patrons come in. 
Guideline 7: Collections 
Four archivists representing three repositories claimed to be able to prove 
ownership of anything in their collections. This is achieved with accession records at 
Small Repository 2, detailed catalog records at Small Repository 7, and insurance 
documentation at Small Repository 8. An archivist at another small repository claimed to 
also be able to establish ownership, but because “[our collections are] not items that I 
think people would contest our ownership of” rather than any record-keeping practices. 
Three archivists at other small repositories distinguished their ability to prove ownership 
between processed materials and the unprocessed backlog (affirmative for the former and 
negative for the latter). An archivist at Small Repository 1 distinguished the 
establishment of ownership between older collections and items accessioned more 
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recently; much of the “stuff that we’ve had for a longer period of time…is cataloged at 
the item level” while newer materials would be “tricky” to prove. An archivist at Large 
Repository 1 drew a line between books and papers, saying that “individual pieces of 
paper” would be more difficult to show ownership of. Condition reports at all nine 
institutions are created irregularly for items of higher value or as fragility concerns arise 
rather than to document item-specific imperfections over time. No archives strive to mark 
every item with an identifier; seven archivists representing six institutions shared that 
some items – typically books or boxes of folders and papers – are marked in some way. 
Most archivists who do not mark papers but do mark other items explained that the 
volume of documents is simply too high for it to be practical or even possible. One 
archivist at a small repository justified, “we don’t see the need” to mark items while 
another said it would “interfere with the integrity of the original item to market.” 
All ten archivists believed the collections security recommendations are effective 
measures to help prevent theft or identify stolen items, but only six found them practical 
for their repository. An archivist at Small Repository 2 said while “marking and whatnot 
is probably the simplest and easiest thing to do…when you start getting into questions of 
physical space, it becomes a little bit more complicated,” referring to the 
recommendation that archives have multiple storage areas with varying security 
elements. She continued, “if you’re not in a purpose-built environment, you have to really 
manipulate what you already have and often make the best of a not-fantastic situation.” 
Another archivist at Small Repository 3 found that marking everything would require too 
many resources – primarily time – to be practical. 
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Guideline 8: Record-Keeping 
Four archivists representing four repositories conduct inventories or shelf list 
checks, but only one reported having a set schedule for doing so. An archivist at Small 
Repository 1 shared that her repository once closed for two weeks to inventory materials 
but only “got through eight collections,” and now “audit…sections of things on a…fairly 
regular basis.” At Small Repository 8, an archivist said “the main reason that inventories 
tend to be conducted are for insurance” purposes rather than security. At Large 
Repository 1 and Small Repositories 3 and 6, shelf list checks are considered more 
practical than full inventories because of the volume of materials. An archivist at Small 
Repository 5 commented that while she has “a lot of lists,” there is not a “single, 
overarching document…for everything.” Four archives keep records of items that are not 
found during inventories or are otherwise noticed to be missing; at Small Repository 1, 
items that have been missing for 10 years or more can be deaccessioned, but there is no 
policy for transitioning a missing item to being considered stolen. She expanded, “we 
don’t have a strong enough handle on our collections intellectually or physically to be 
able to say” whether an item has been stolen or shelved incorrectly. An archivist at Small 
Repository 3 did not believe there is a “steadfast rule,” but estimated that after six months 
an item could move from unlocated to missing, but still not necessarily stolen. There is 
no guiding policy at Small Repository 5, but an archivist said that her preference is to 
“keep those notes forever, just because…you never know if someone’s going to ask about 
something.” At Large Repository 1, items considered unlocated typically remain that way 
unless they are particularly high-value: “our assumption generally is that we simply can’t 
find it.” Eight of the nine repositories retain deaccession records, but only four have 
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policies that require permanent retention (the outlying repository has no policy or 
precedent for how to handle deaccessions). 
All ten participants believed the recommendations under this guideline are 
effective security measures; although adequate record-keeping practices may not stop a 
thief, they enable archivists to better detect when thefts have occurred. Three believed 
they are impractical for their archive due to the time required to conduct inventories. An 
archivist at Small Repository 2 explained that in order for inventories to be practical, 
“you already have [to have] a comprehensive and solid foundation that is already doing 
best practices” to build from. An inventory requires having a shelf list, item-level finding 
aids, or some other granular resource to compare against, and additionally requires the 
time to dedicate to such an effort, which three archivists argued was not practical for their 
repositories. 
Guideline 9: Legal Responsibilities 
None of the archivists reporting being trained to deal with suspicious patrons; one 
archivist at Small Repository 3, however, described his conversations with staff to “find 
discreet ways to communicate” concerns while keeping each other safe. At Large 
Repository 1, an archivist explained how some especially valuable collections can attract 
“groupies” and staff are advised to “watch them more closely” and review their personal 
items as they leave the reading room more carefully. The archivist added that there is a 
panic button such that “if anything particularly unusual or violent happened, there is a 
way for us to summon an actual security guard.” An archivist at Small Repository 6 
thought, “I would probably consult with our library director and we would figure out how 
to approach the situation.” Two archives have a policy for reporting thefts, but the 
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remaining seven have no written commitment to report thefts when they are discovered. 
At one small repository within an academic library, archivists report thefts to campus 
safety and then campus safety is “responsible for contacting the local police.” At Small 
Repository 8, once staff realize something is missing, it would be reported to another 
department and so on up the organizational “hierarchy, and then the decision would be 
made higher up.” The archivist believed that “depend[ing] on the nature of the theft, if it 
was something extremely important and expensive, it would be reported to law 
enforcement.” Although a majority of the archives represented in this study do not have a 
policy dictating that thefts would be reported, the archivists all thought their repositories 
would report: “I would think so”; “I see no reason why we would not just report it”; 
“common sense would be that [thefts] would [be reported].” 
Every archivist believed that the legal guideline was both effective at maintaining 
a secure archive and practical for their own repository. One archivist at an academic 
library that has no suspicious patron training or reporting policy felt that while the 
guideline is a good security measure, “theft is so low on our list of concerns in the 
archives that we’ve probably felt pretty comfortable with the precautions that we’ve 
taken.” Another archivist disagreed and said that being prepared to deal with suspicious 
patrons and having a commitment to reporting expressed in policy was more than 
effective and practical, but “necessary.” 
Guideline 10: Institutional Support 
No archive has a policy that specifically commits staff to cooperating with law 
enforcement to the fullest extent to investigate and prosecute thefts. Six archivists at six 
archives felt optimistic that their institution would be supportive without such a policy: “I 
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would think so”; “I assume that…we’d be cooperative”; “I would imagine so.” One 
archivist thought that trying to “suppress” a theft would only “backfire” on an institution, 
whereas reporting and investigating openly would reflect a dedication to address any gaps 
in the security policy and preserve a sense of trust among potential future donors. 
Another archivist believed insurance valuation would be a deciding factor in how her 
repository would respond to a theft. However, two archivists thought administrators, 
depending on the likelihood of stolen items being returned, “may or may not want to 
pursue something” that could bring “bad publicity for our institution and the effectiveness 
of its employees.” One archivist at an academic library feared that “resistance to…police 
on campus” would make administrators waver on whether or not to involve law 
enforcement and create a “really sticky” situation. 
All ten archivists agreed that institutional commitment to supporting law 
enforcement officials in their response to thefts is an effective security measure. One 
archivist went further, arguing that having such a policy is “necessary.” Despite this, 
another archivist at a small repository found it to be impractical for her archive. Her 
practice is to respond to suspected thefts “informally” and “assume that [administrators] 
would take us at our word and follow up on it.”
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Discussion 
The Assumption Made in the Guidelines 
The Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections were created 
by the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL), a professional 
organization with thousands of members in the academic library community. Because of 
their attachment to higher education institutions, archives under this umbrella have larger 
collections and more resources available to them than a town historical society or 
community archive. The Guidelines reflect this audience in several instances where 
recommended practices are overwhelming for smaller repositories due to their limited 
staff, such as evaluating materials before and after use and supervising the reading room 
at all times. While this is, of course, understandable, and the writers of the Guidelines 
themselves agree that not every recommendation is feasible in every repository, it is 
nevertheless noteworthy that these assumptions regarding resources exist. Indeed, when 
adapting the recommendations for special collections libraries, there was a conscious 
effort to create a set of “comprehensive and scalable” practices that would be “broadly 
applicable” (ACRL/RBMS Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special 
Collections, 2009), but archivists at small repositories who were interviewed for this 
study still felt the Guidelines presuppose a certain “type of institution” and “level of 
resources” that they do not fit into. Having goals and striving to adopt the best practices 
possible is certainly beneficial, but the Guidelines’ implementation suggestions do not 
provide much instruction for archivists looking to simplify the more demanding practices 
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into something manageable. There are also, according to New England Archivists 
President Linda Hocking, no resources or programming (or demand for them) to support 
archivists in such efforts from the sole professional organization in the region, despite 
acknowledging that New England repositories often fall into the category of being unable 
to implement best practices. It can be easy, therefore, to disregard the Guidelines as 
necessary only for larger repositories because they can seem unattainable for smaller-
scale institutions; however, the endorsement from the Society of American Archivists – 
beginning in 1993 and continuing with the 2012 revision – makes clear that the 
Guidelines are accepted best practices for all archives. 
The history of New England is renowned for bringing together the individual 
experiences of a deeply independent people, and is represented far and wide within the 
region in prestigious university archives, humble historical societies, and everything in 
between. Institutions that do not fit the mold of an academic or similarly-endowed library 
should still strive to adopt the Guidelines, but this may require creative thinking. Much of 
the recommendations are focused around establishing intellectual and physical control of 
materials so archivists know what they have and where it is (and has been). Regardless of 
how this is done in different repositories, it is vital to be able to identify when something 
is missing and to know that it has been stolen rather than simply misplaced. Many thefts 
are not discovered until stolen items are advertised for sale, by which time they are more 
difficult to recover and the thieves more difficult to apprehend. The security practices of 
one repository will – and should – differ from another according to the availability of 
funding and time, collection size and research value, and many more factors, but they 
should aspire to the same set of ideals; if the Guidelines cannot be adopted as they are 
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written, at least they should serve as beacons to aim toward rather than something to 
disregard as irrelevant. 
Small Repositories Need Security, Too 
There was an observed tendency for some participants at small repositories to feel 
that the Guidelines are beyond impractical, and in fact excessive and unnecessary, for 
their institutions; they are certainly not the only archivists in New England, or the 
profession more broadly, with this notion.  
“The materials that we have in our archives really don’t have any kind of financial 
value. And they’re…quite relatively new, and so we don’t feel that they’re going 
to be items that would likely be stolen.” 
 
The above excerpt of an interview with an archivist at a small institutional repository 
exemplifies how archivists may perceive their burgeoning collections as not on the radar 
of potential thieves. Newly-established repositories, or ones with few materials or 
collections that do not yet have much research value, may truly not need the level of 
security the Guidelines recommend. Several archivists in the course of this study justified 
not implementing certain policies (reviewing materials after use and conducting 
inventories, for example) because they believed their collections do not currently warrant 
them – that there are not enough researchers or items of sufficient value to bother. While 
newer collections may be less susceptible to researcher theft or other external thieves, 
however, insiders with a personal connection to materials may be more tempted to take 
something they feel would not be missed by others but would be appreciated by 
themselves; the risk of theft at such repositories may thus be different, but it is not absent. 
The time to develop security policies, therefore, is before they are needed, to allow the 
collection to grow into them and staff to become comfortable with them. 
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A common theme that emerged from speaking with archivists at more established 
institutions, large and small, was that change is difficult. Adopting new security policies 
not only impacts how archivists manage collections but also how patrons interact with 
materials, and there is often resistance when new practices are judged to be inconvenient 
or untrusting. 
“[I]t’s hard, you know, in a long…lived institution, there are a lot of things that 
are…difficult to change.” 
 
“[O]ne thing that’s been a little trickier is we have, obviously, beloved long-time 
researchers…[and] they’re not used to having to put their bags in lockers, that sort of 
thing.” 
 
“[I]t’s, like, hard to make those changes.” 
 
Three different participants made the above statements about the difficulty of updating 
archival security practices. Participants with supervisory powers also highlighted the 
additional challenge of ensuring enforcement of new policies among lower staff members 
who may be responsible for monitoring researchers in the reading room; one archivist 
described an attitude of “coaching…to encourage new practices.” While it may be true 
that the smallest and newest repositories do not yet have a need for the highest level of 
security recommended by the Guidelines, they are not exempt from considering security 
altogether. At the very least, it is clear that developing comprehensive policies early and 
modifying them appropriately over time is easier rather than creating them later on. In 
their entirety, the Guidelines may be overzealous for especially modest archives, but the 
principle is to establish what an adequate security plan looks like and should do. 
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What Should a Good Security Policy Do? 
A good security policy cannot prevent theft. Rather, its goal is to reduce the risk 
of theft and to prevent thieves from exploiting that risk as much as possible. It is 
obviously far better to never have an item be stolen; if or when it is, however, a good 
security policy should give an archive the power to get it back. No policy can be perfect, 
and improvements can and should be made as weaknesses are discovered – a gap for an 
outsider to capitalize upon or a loophole for an insider to squeeze through. A large part of 
the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines are, consequently, dedicated to giving archivists the 
greatest possible chance to recover stolen items. The three most important concepts for 
archivists to think about are knowing what is in their collection, following the movement 
of items throughout the repository, and documenting their collections. 
It is vital that intellectual and physical control be asserted over archival 
collections such that archivists can know what they have and know when it has been 
stolen. Additionally, security policies should be written with the knowledge of the 
repository’s more valuable or vulnerable items in mind. Among the tools recommended 
in the Guidelines, inventories, shelf lists, detailed description records, and condition 
reports are the most well-known methods used by archivists for this purpose. These 
practices can furthermore facilitate the discovery of missing items and establish a limited 
period of time during which the theft took place, giving law enforcement a better 
opportunity to catch a thief and recover the stolen materials. Regularly conducting 
inventories and updating shelf lists and condition reports were observed to be impractical 
for several repositories in this study, but there are other means of maintaining intellectual 
control. If a complete inventory is too ambitious, perhaps evaluating one collection or 
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storage area at a time with greater frequency is more manageable. If any form of regular 
inventory is impossible, materials should be subjected to a review whenever they are 
requested by researchers. High-value or otherwise vulnerable items should be identified 
by a sticker or indicator attached to the folder or box to indicate their presence to staff 
and ensure that these specifically are assessed. To quickly determine that all materials 
have been returned, boxes or individual folders can be weighed and compared with a 
previous measurement. Regardless of how collections are managed, archivists must be 
able to discover thefts soon after they occur to give themselves and law enforcement the 
best chance of success. 
Repository staff are not the only people who handle archival materials, and 
researchers must also be held responsible to keep collections safe. The most crucial 
security practice after logistical care of materials is researcher supervision. The 
Guidelines dictate that a staff member must be in the reading room at all times to oversee 
researchers and be prepared to remove any pens or prohibited personal items. Archivists 
must also pay attention for suspicious behavior that may indicate an attempted theft and 
be able to step in or quickly summon a security officer. Many repositories have such 
minimal staffing, however, that consistent supervision is simply impossible and archivists 
are pulled in too many different directions to prioritize observation. While it is obviously 
ideal to have staff available to oversee researchers and possibly intervene before a 
highlighter is used or a document is taken out of the building, security cameras can help 
supplement the lack of physical supervision and record the reading room. The ability to 
rely on cameras hinges upon their strategic placement: lenses must focus on patrons at 
work tables, exit points, and the space in between such that the path of a researcher-
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turned-thief can be traced as he or she moves throughout the public areas of the 
repository. Footage should also be saved for a longer period of time in case a theft is 
discovered later. Whether directly or virtually – though preferably both – archivists must 
be able to see the reading room at all times and hold researchers accountable. 
The final component of a good security policy considers the ways in which a 
repository can document ownership of their collections such that if an item is stolen, it 
can be recognized and returned. The Guidelines provide several means of demonstrating 
ownership, and it is best if archivists use more than one to ensure that there is a sufficient 
burden of proof. Ownership should be shown both in internal catalog records and items 
themselves, which can be used together to claim materials that have been recovered by 
law enforcement. Marking items with ownership symbols may also enable (legitimate) 
document traders and antique dealers to identify stolen materials and return them without 
law enforcement. Catalog record details that support an archive’s legal possession of 
items can include accession information, dates of creation or publication, names of 
creators, physical extent, condition reports, custodial and processing history, and other 
unique or identifiable characteristics. Including this information – or what of this 
information is known for individual items – while processing new acquisitions is not 
impractical, but condition reports that are updated on an ongoing basis to reflect wear and 
damage may be less achievable, and may still not be able to identify one copy from 
another of the same item. Marking items can be a more efficient and reliable means of 
concretely indicating to whom they belong and may be either subtle or obvious. 
Registered microdots are an invisible form of security that can only be seen by archivists 
and law enforcement officials who know where and how to look for them. Microdots can 
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be adhered to any surface, making them suitable for textiles and other artifacts as well as 
books, papers, and photographs, and can easily be incorporated into processing 
workflows. An accession number written in archival ink in a small corner is a more 
noticeable type of mark that can serve as clear proof of ownership and is appropriate for 
books, documents, photographs, and some artifacts; book plates and archival ink or 
embossed stamps are similarly recognizable symbols that are often used in books. While 
detailed catalog records are an important method of establishing ownership as well as 
intellectual control, some form of physical marking is more likely to be definitive and a 
more efficient practice to incorporate. 
When considering security practices, redundancy is a positive attribute; every 
practice will have gaps – both known and unknown – and what may normally seem 
superfluous may become what prevents a theft or helps stolen materials be returned. The 
ACRL/RBMS Guidelines include a great deal of redundancy, and this may intimidate and 
alienate repositories that cannot adopt them in full or that regard them as unnecessary. It 
should be made clear that archivists must incorporate or adapt what policies are practical 
for them, but consider what risks emerge in the absence of what they find impractical and 
how those risks can be addressed in a more manageable way.
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Conclusion 
No security policy is omniscient or infallible; if someone is determined to steal 
something from an archive, it is likely that they will. Security practices must improve 
based on individual experiences and collaboration among archival professionals rather 
than simply ignoring risks or addressing them in isolation. The reluctance of eligible 
archivists to speak with a researcher about their repositories’ security practices highlights 
how taboo a topic security truly is in the archival field, and limits the ability of any study 
to produce meaningful data. Several archivists who declined to participate in this study 
explained that part of their institution’s security policy prohibited them from speaking to 
someone outside their organization about security, but each archivist who did consent to 
an interview found some way to improve their repository’s security because of their 
participation. Without studies like this to explore what real security policies look like and 
how the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines are used in practice, it would be impossible to 
determine what measures are truly workable and what additional support is needed. It is 
therefore the responsibility of archivists and archive leaders to reframe the conversation 
around security.  
As the stewards of historically significant materials, it is the duty of archivists to 
ensure that those materials endure into the future. Just as disaster preparedness is the 
focus of professional conference presentations to raise awareness and promote new and 
better ideas, so too should security be openly discussed among colleagues. A common 
justification among archives leaders for not advocating for greater security and working 
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with law enforcement during theft investigations is the fear of negative publicity 
discouraging potential benefactors, but advocating and cooperating should be seen as a 
strength and framed as such to future donors. When creating gift agreements and 
explaining to a donor how their collection will be treated, security can be discussed 
openly and proudly as a measurement of care and value; indeed, perhaps comprehensive 
security policies to protect and recover materials make one repository more desirable than 
another to a famous author looking to donate his or her personal papers. The conversation 
around archival theft should hinge not on the fact that it unfortunately occurs, but instead 
how it can be prevented and, even more importantly, how stolen items can be returned. 
The Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum is a household name in New England not 
for its unconventional founder, illustrious collection of American, European, and Asian 
art, or unique architecture, but for the unsolved 1990 theft of 13 works of art worth a 
combined $500 million – still the largest art theft in world history to date. Even more 
iconic than the theft itself is the image of empty frames still hanging on gallery walls 
from which canvases were cut, in keeping with Gardner’s will that the collection and 
museum’s layout remain permanent. Countless books, articles, movies, and podcasts have 
been created by professional and amateur sleuths trying to solve the crime and earn the 
$10 million reward that remains unclaimed. The Gardner Museum also returns to 
mainstream news as people of interest in the federal investigation die, and often during 
coverage of significant thefts for reference. In April 2021, a four-episode true crime 
series titled This Is a Robbery: The World’s Biggest Art Heist was released to the 
streaming giant, Netflix, for hundreds of millions of subscribers to watch and theorize for 
themselves. While the museum has made the best of such publicity to encourage visitors 
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to patronize the campus, the loss of such significant pieces of art cannot and should not 
be forgotten. Works by Vermeer, Rembrandt, Flinck, Manet, and Degas were all victims, 
stolen not just from the museum but from Isabella Stewart Gardner herself and the world 
she wanted to share her collection with. It is assumed that any theft will deal a significant 
blow to a repository, but the Gardner Museum heist has proven itself unique with the 
reverberating pain felt in Boston and throughout New England, and the case’s unabating 
allure after more than three decades. 
This study explored the level of adherence to the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines 
Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections among New England archives. 
Because of the difficulty to identify archivists at large repositories who would consent to 
an interview, the perspectives of archivists at small repositories dominated the results of 
this study. Overall, the Guidelines as best practices are a valuable inspiration and were 
believed to be effective theft prevention measures. However, many of the 
recommendations were not practical in small repositories where limited staff and 
resources preclude more demanding and time-consuming practices. There was also a 
feeling among small repositories that the level of security recommended by the 
Guidelines is only needed in larger archives with more prestigious collections, despite the 
fact that the Guidelines have been endorsed by the Society of American Archivists as best 
practices for archival security. Further research should include similar studies that are not 
geographically restricted to New England, that include more participants (particularly 
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Appendix A. ACRL/RBMS Guidelines Regarding Security and 
Theft in Special Collections 
This Appendix includes the text of Part I of the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines that 
focus on security measures. References to Part II or appendices may appear, but these 
sections have not been included in this Appendix. The full Guidelines can be found at 
http://www.ala.org/acrl/standards/security_theft.  
 
These guidelines identify important issues that collection administrators should 
address in developing adequate security measures and a strategy for responding to thefts. 
While directed primarily toward special collections in the U.S., many topics are also 
applicable to general collections and to special collections in other countries. “Special 
Collections” here refers to repositories containing rare books, manuscripts, archives, and 
other antiquarian and special materials. “Booksellers” refers to those who sell such 
materials. In the term “library security officer,” “library” is understood to mean any 
special collections repository.  
It should be noted that these best practices and recommendations have been 
written with an eye toward them being both comprehensive and scalable, so that they are 
broadly applicable in most special collection settings. Nevertheless, it is also recognized 
that this document is perforce aspirational: full compliance with these guidelines may not 
be possible in every instance given a variety of factors, including fiscal constraints; 
mission- and programmatic-driven considerations; local practices and needs related to 
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collections and staff; and the diversity—and limitations of—libraries’ architecture and 
design.  
Part I: Security Measures 
1. Introduction 
Administrators of special collections must ensure that their materials remain intact 
and secure from theft and damage. The security of collections is now especially important 
since administrators' efforts to increase the use and knowledge of collections in their care 
can result in a greater public awareness of their value and may increase the risk of theft. 
Security arrangements may vary from one institution to another and are dependent on 
staffing, physical setting, and use. 
Booksellers also must concern themselves with collection security, since thieves 
may offer stolen materials to them for sale. Administrators should make every effort to 
familiarize booksellers with the ways institutions attempt to secure and identify their 
materials and help them use this knowledge to lessen anyone's chances of profiting from 
theft. 
The appointment of a library security officer and the development of a written 
security policy can help ensure that staff is aware of their legal and procedural 
responsibilities in applying security measures. 
2. The Library Security Officer  
All staff holding positions in special collections settings should work to ensure the 
security of the collections in their care. To this end, institutions should endeavor to foster
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a workplace culture that recognizes not only the importance of their special collections 
but also the security risks inherent in the storage, usage, and movement of these 
materials.  
While the security of the collections should be every employee’s concern, 
institutions should, nevertheless, appoint a library security officer who has the authority 
to carry out the organization’s security program. The person in this role—who typically 
performs this function as part of his or her overall job responsibilities—should possess a 
thorough knowledge of all repository security needs, particularly those of special 
collections. The library security officer should not necessarily be conceived of as an 
institution’s general security officer, although he or she may also serve in that capacity. If 
necessary, the functions of the library security officer may be assigned to several 
individuals within an institution, rather than to a single employee. 
The library security officer is the person with principal responsibility for planning 
and administering a security program, which should include a survey of the collections, 
reviews of the physical layout of the institution, and training of the institution's staff. He 
or she should develop and maintain active working relationships with colleagues and seek 
the advice and assistance of appropriate personnel such as institutional administrators, 
corporate counsel, life safety officers, and consultants from law enforcement agencies 
and insurance companies. 
Suggestions for implementation: 
• In some repositories, the library security officer and the special collections 
administrator may be the same person. 
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• The functions of the library security officer may be assigned to several individuals 
within an institution, rather than to a single employee 
• Special collections administrators in institutions without another official for 
whom the role of library security officer would be appropriate are encouraged to 
take on this role and advocate that the institution recognize the importance of this 
responsibility. 
3. The Security Policy 
The library security officers should develop a written policy on the security of the 
collections, in consultation with administrators and staff, legal authorities, and other 
knowledgeable persons. The policy should include a standard operating procedure on 
dealing with a theft or other security problems. The security policy should be kept up-to-
date with current names and telephone numbers of institutional and law enforcement 
contacts. The institution should also review the policy periodically to insure that 
institutional needs continue to be adequately addressed. The library security officer 
should be involved with the development and implementation of general security 
measures, as these may affect the security of special collections materials. The library 
security officer should also be involved with emergency and disaster planning. 
Suggestions for implementation: 
• In large institutions it may be necessary to assemble a Security Planning Group to 
assist the library security officer in identifying problem areas and to recommend 
solutions. This group, made up of the library security officer and other appropriate 
personnel, will be responsible for developing a security plan to prevent theft and a 
detailed plan of action to follow when a theft is discovered. The plan may be a 
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part of the institution's disaster plan or constitute a separate plan. The plan should 
not be a public document (e.g., it should not be posted on a web site), but 
accessible only to appropriate institutional personnel. 
• Institutions that lack appropriate staff resources may wish to bring in a security 
consultant to assist in developing a policy and in determining any major threats to 
the collection. When engaging a security consultant, the institution or library 
security officer should use caution in evaluating the consultant's competence or 
ability to perform the work. The institution should investigate the security 
consultant's background and references thoroughly. 
4. The Facility 
The special collections building, unit, or area should have as few access points as 
possible. Fire and emergency exits, which should be strictly controlled and alarmed, 
should not be used for regular access. Within the facility itself, the public should have 
access only to public areas, not to work areas or stack space. Researchers should be 
received in a separate reception area where a coat room and lockers should be provided 
for researchers' personal belongings and outerwear. A secure reading room, classroom, or 
other designated space where researchers can be continuously monitored by staff should 
be identified as the only area in which material may be used. A staff member or security 
guard should check researchers' personal materials before they enter the secure area as 
well as when they depart. 
Keys or electronic keycards are especially vulnerable items; therefore, a 
controlled check-out system for all keys should be maintained. Keys to secure areas 
should be issued to staff only on an as-needed basis, and master keys should be secured 
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against unauthorized access. Combinations or alarm codes for vaults or other secure 
collection storage areas should have limited distribution and be changed each time a staff 
member with access leaves his or her position. Strong consideration should be given to 
installing proprietary keyways (i.e., unique keys and locks available only from a single 
manufacturer) in locks in the special collections area. Security cameras should be 
installed that cover reading rooms and any access points that security professionals deem 
appropriate. All recordings should be retained for as long as possible, preferably 
permanently. 
Suggestions for implementation: 
• In institutions where it is not possible to hire a security guard, a designated staff 
member could perform the guard’s function. Consideration should be given to 
installing a video surveillance system. 
• As a precautionary policy, keys and locks to secure areas should be changed on a 
regular basis. 
• When an institution plans to remodel, renovate space, or build a new facility for 
special collections materials, the library security officer and the special 
collections administrator should ensure that all security needs are addressed in the 
design and planning. 
5. Staff 
An atmosphere of trust and concern for the collections is probably the best 
guarantee against theft by staff. Nevertheless, close and equitable supervision is essential. 
The staff, including students and volunteers, should be chosen carefully. Careful 
personnel management is an ongoing necessity. Disgruntled staff may seek retribution 
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through theft, destruction, or willful mishandling of collections. Consideration should be 
given to bonding employees who work in special collections. Training the staff in 
security measures should be a high priority of the library security officer. Such training 
should ensure that staff is aware of their legal and procedural responsibilities in relation 
to security as well as their own and the researchers' legal rights when handling breaches. 
Staff should be discouraged from taking personal belongings into secure areas, and such 
belongings should be subject to inspection by security staff when exiting. 
Suggestions for implementation: 
• The library security officer and special collections administrators should ensure 
that staff is familiar with these guidelines and the security policies in their 
institutions and how they may apply specifically to their institution. New staff 
should receive security training in a timely fashion as part of their orientation 
process. 
• Appropriate or consistent with institutional policies, background checks and 
bonding of staff members should be undertaken. 
• The library security officer and special collections administrators should be 
familiar with the institution's personnel policies, and advocate security concerns 
with the institution's human resources staff. 
6. Researchers 
The special collections administrator must carefully balance the responsibility of 
making materials available to researchers against the responsibility of ensuring the 
security of the materials. Registration for each researcher who uses special collections 
materials should be required, including the name, address, legal acknowledgment, and 
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institutional affiliation (if any). Photo identification or some other form of positive 
identification is necessary to establish physical identity. Records should also be kept of 
projects researchers are working on and of collections they will be using. These 
registration records should be retained permanently. 
Staff must be able to identify who has used which materials by keeping adequate 
checkout records, whether paper or electronic. These records should also be retained 
indefinitely in order to be available to law enforcement authorities if thefts or vandalism 
later come to light. No matter what their format, the records should unequivocally link a 
particular researcher to a specific item. 
Special collections security plans must take into consideration institutional 
policies, especially those pertaining to confidentiality, of their parent institution. Access 
to registration and circulation records should be restricted. Institutional policies and 
practices, especially in the course of investigating possible thefts, should not violate 
applicable confidentiality laws. Library security officers should be familiar with all 
applicable laws governing personally identifiable information about users. 
Each researcher should be given an orientation to the rules governing the use of 
the collections. Rules should be prominently posted as well as available on the 
institution’s web site. Researchers should legally acknowledge compliance with these 
regulations. Researchers should not be permitted to take extraneous personal materials 
into the reading areas. These may include such items as notebooks, briefcases, outerwear, 
books, and voluminous papers. Personal computers should be removed from the case 
before use in the reading room is permitted. Lockers or some kind of secure space should 
be provided for any items not permitted in the reading room. 
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Staff should observe researchers at all times and not allow them to work 
unobserved behind bookcases, book trucks, stacks of books, or any other obstacles that 
restrict staff view. Researchers should be limited at any one time to having access only to 
those books, manuscripts, or other items that are needed to perform the research at hand. 
Staff should check the condition, content, and completeness of each item before 
circulating it and when it is returned after use. This checking of materials that are 
returned is especially important for the use of archival and manuscript collections, which 
often consist of many loose, unique pieces. Researchers should be required to return all 
materials before leaving the reading room, even if they plan to return later to continue 
their research. They should not be allowed to exchange items or to have access to 
materials brought into the room for use by another researcher. 
Suggestions for implementation: 
• The library security officer or special collections administrator should seek the 
advice of the institution's legal counsel or other appropriate legal authority when 
developing researcher policies in order to ensure adequate legal recourse if 
researchers violate the use agreement. 
• The institution should require that all researchers read and legally acknowledge an 
agreement to abide by institutional policies. 
7. Classrooms 
Security and handling policies governing reading rooms apply to classroom 
settings. Further, written security and handling policies for classroom settings should be 
part of a repository’s overall security policy. When possible, these security and handling 
guidelines should be distributed to the participants prior to the session and reviewed by 
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the instructor and the participants at the beginning of the session. Staff should make clear 
who is allowed to handle materials during the session.  
All requests for classroom sessions should be reviewed and approved by 
repository staff. Criteria to be considered include the number of items; the type and 
condition of the materials; the number of participants; and the instructor’s level of 
experience in working with special collections materials. The repository may wish to 
limit the number of items shown in a class session or the number of participants based on 
available staffing, space, or other factors.  
The repository should require a staff member to be present in the room while 
special collection materials are being used; staff should not leave materials unattended in 
classroom settings. Whenever possible, security cameras should be installed that cover 
classrooms. All recordings should be retained for as long as possible, preferably 
permanently. 
If possible, participants should register in advance of the session according to the 
same procedures utilized for the reading room. At minimum, a list of the participants for 
each session should be retained. This may be accomplished through a sign-in sheet or a 
list prepared in advance of the session. Items not permitted in the reading room should 
not be permitted in the classroom. Any material that participants bring into the classroom 
should be reviewed by staff when the participants depart.  
The repository should keep thorough records of the items used for classes and 
retain this information indefinitely. A list of items should be prepared before the session. 
When the materials are collected, they should be checked against the list to ensure that all 
items are present. 
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Staff should review materials carefully before and after the session. Staff should 
restrict handling of fragile materials in classroom settings or call attention to that item’s 
fragility and demonstrate appropriate handling techniques at the beginning of the session. 
As much as possible, materials should be described and marked before being shown in a 
classroom setting according to the guidelines in Appendix I. 
Suggestions for implementation: 
• Institutions should develop classroom policies that incorporate existing reading 
room rules and security practices. Such policies should stipulate classroom 
handling and staffing requirements as well as note any limits on the number 
and/or type of collection items that may be requested. The maximum number of 
classroom attendees should also be stated, along with any record-keeping 
requirements. Classroom policies should be flexible enough to allow additional 
precautionary measures to be enacted when necessary. 
• Institutions should make their policies accessible on their websites and review 
them with the participants prior to the classroom session.  
• Institutions may wish to provide an orientation to new faculty on how to teach 
responsibly with special collections materials. These training sessions can serve 
as a form of outreach. 
8. The Collections 
Administrators of special collections must be able to identify positively the 
materials in their collections to establish loss and to substantiate claims to recovered 
stolen property. This process includes keeping adequate accession records, maintaining 
detailed cataloging records and lists in finding aids, recording copy-specific information, 
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and keeping condition reports and records. Lists developed to fulfill the requirements of 
insurance policies should also be kept current. In addition, the materials themselves 
should be made identifiable by marking them following the Guidelines for Marking 
(Appendix I), by applying other unique marks, and by keeping photographic, digital, or 
microform copies of valuable items. 
A recent theft or act of vandalism may give an indication of a building area, 
subject, or type of material that will be the target of future theft or mutilation. If 
appropriate, transfer materials related to those already stolen or mutilated to a more 
secure area. The theft or mutilation of printed books or manuscripts may indicate that 
other genres of materials containing similar subject matter will become the targets of 
thieves and vandals. 
Many institutions house materials in open stack areas accessible to all users. 
These open stack areas may contain rare materials which are unidentified and 
unprotected. Materials in open stacks are most vulnerable to breaches in security. Many 
thieves search these areas for materials considered rare, rather than attempt to infiltrate 
special collections or outwit the security measures implemented in monitored reading 
rooms. Institutions should establish procedures for the routine review of general stacks, 
using the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines on the Selection and Transfer of Materials from 
General Collections to Special Collections to assist in identifying rare materials on the 
open shelves in need of protection. 
Suggestion for implementation: 
• Items that are more valuable should be segregated from the collections into higher 
security areas, with more restricted conditions for staff access and researcher use. 
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9. Record-Keeping, Description, and Cataloging 
A. Catalog all materials as fully as institutional resources and descriptive practices 
will allow. Stolen materials that have been described in detail are far more easily 
identified and recovered. Materials that have not been completely cataloged or processed 
should be made available to researchers only if security is not compromised and 
additional precautions (such as more stringent supervision of use, a reduction in the 
number of items dispensed at one time and marking of items) are taken. 
B. In the case of books, use the catalog record to describe copy-specific 
characteristics (e.g., binding, marks of previous ownership, defects) and bibliographic 
information that helps to distinguish among editions, issues, and states. Maintain 
complete acquisitions records, including antiquarian catalog descriptions. Create 
machine-readable records for local public access and international bibliographic 
databases. Participate in bibliographic projects that record detailed bibliographic 
descriptions. 
C. Conduct regular inventories of both cataloged and uncataloged book 
collections and other collections when possible. This task is most effectively performed 
by staff members working in teams and should be conducted on a random basis. 
Proceeding through the collection in a predictable manner is not wise since it may allow 
thieves to temporarily replace stolen materials. A simultaneous reconciliation of the shelf 
list with the collection is also recommended. Inventories conducted even in small stages 
are valuable since they may reveal thefts (as well as misshelved books) and serve as a 
deterrent to any potential in-house thieves. 
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D. Maintain a shelf list, preferably in paper form for special collections, in a 
secure area. If the shelf list is electronic, it should be secure from tampering and a backup 
should be stored off-site. Since the shelf list indicates precisely where each item should 
be located, and because it contains copy-specific information about special collections 
materials, its maintenance and security are vital for detecting and recovering thefts. 
E. Maintain up-to-date records of unlocated items and periodically recheck them; 
consider reporting missing items which are still unlocated after several searches to 
appropriate agencies (see II.3.B. below), noting their status as missing rather than stolen. 
F. Keep careful, detailed records of deaccessions. Refer to Appendix I for 
guidelines on marking deaccessioned material. 
10. Legal and Procedural Responsibilities 
The administrators of special collections and the library security officer must 
know laws relating to library and archival theft as well as institutional policies on 
apprehension of suspects and must convey this information to staff; they must also report 
thefts promptly to appropriate law enforcement agencies. Staff members must be aware 
of their legal rights in stopping thefts without infringing on the rights of suspects. 
Suggestion for implementation: 
• Library security officers and/or special collections administrators should take an 
active role in raising the awareness of other institutional officials, e.g., 
institutional legal officers, public safety officers, the director, et al., regarding the 
serious nature of materials theft, and urge the institution to resolve security threats 
and breaches and to seek the strictest punishment possible for those convicted of 
theft or other security violations. 
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11. Institutional and Legislative Support 
A. Work with the institutional administration to ensure their support for the 
prosecution of thieves. This support may range from the collection of evidence to be 
shared with prosecutors, to direct participation with the prosecution before and during the 
trial. 
B. Work with appropriate institutional, local, and state groups to lobby for 
strengthening state laws regarding library and archival thefts and for diligent prosecution 
of such crimes. (See Appendix II: “Draft of Model Legislation: Theft and Mutilation of 
Library Materials.”)
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Appendix B. Listserv Recruitment Message 
Request for participation! 
 
In June 2020, a Carnegie Library archivist and local Pittsburgh book dealer were 
convicted of stealing and selling hundreds of rare maps, books, and other artifacts over 
two decades, and seven million dollars’ worth of items remain missing. One of the most 
important missions among archivists today is to make archives more accessible, but that 
must be in balance with keeping collections safe.  
 
The purpose of this master’s-level research study will be to understand the current state 
of security policies in New England archives. Specifically, it will evaluate how the 
Association of College and Research Libraries/Rare Books and Manuscript Section’s 
Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections are utilized in practice. 
The guiding questions for this research are as follows: Do archivists in New England feel 
the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines are adequate to help them protect their collections? How 
closely do New England archival repositories follow the Guidelines? How does 
adherence to the Guidelines differ in small and large archives? 
 
This project is a research study. Data will be gathered by conducting interviews with 
archivists working in New England archives. Participants will be asked to evaluate their 
institution’s security policy and the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines. Neither archivists nor 
repositories will be identified, and participants will have the opportunity to approve or 
request revisions to any sections of the research paper in which their archive is discussed. 
 
Please contact the Principal Investigator, Katie Greene, at krose21@live.unc.edu for 
more information and to participate. 
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Appendix C. Personalized Recruitment Message 
Dear [name of archivist], 
 
My name is Katie Greene and I am e-mailing to request your participation in my research 
study. I am a second-year graduate student at the School of Information and Library 
Science at the University of North Carolina studying Archives and Records Management. 
I would like to interview you and discuss [name of archive]’s security policy and the 
Association of College and Research Libraries/Rare Books and Manuscript Section’s 
Guidelines Regarding Security and Theft in Special Collections for my master’s paper. 
 
My research questions are: Do archivists in New England feel the ACRL/RBMS 
Guidelines are adequate to help them protect their collections? How closely do New 
England archival repositories follow the Guidelines? How does adherence to the 
Guidelines differ in small and large archives? 
 
Neither you nor your institution will be identified. The data will primarily be represented 
in statistical form, and outliers with unique policies or observations will be identified 
only as “Small Repository 1,” Large Repository 2,” etc. You will also have the 
opportunity to approve or request revisions to any sections of the research paper in which 
[name of archive] is discussed. 
 
Please e-mail me if you would like to participate or have any questions. 
 





Appendix D. Interview Guide 
General 
1. Would you classify your archive as small or large? Approximately how many 
physical items are in your collections? 
2. What is your role in your archive? What is your job title? 
3. Did you have any knowledge about the ACRL/RBMS Guidelines Regarding 
Security and Theft in Special Collections before receiving recruitment messages 
about this study? 
 
Guidelines 
1. The Library Security Officer 
a. Does your archive have a Library Security Officer or Special Collections 
Administrator with a similar role? 
i. If yes, why?  
ii. If no, why not? 
iii. Do you think this is an effective security measure? 
iv. Do you think this is a practical security measure? 
2. The Security Policy 
a. Does your archive have a Security Policy? 
i. If yes, why?  
1. When was it created?  
2. How often is it revised and by whom?  
ii. If no, why not?  
1. Do you plan to create one? 
iii. Do you think this is an effective security measure? 
iv. Do you think this is a practical security measure? 
3. The Facility
 78 
a. Was your archive built to be an archive, or has the space been repurposed 
from something else? 
b. Does your archive have limited points of access? 
i. Are there separate public and staff-only areas? 
ii. Is there a space for visitors to place personal items? 
c. Does your archive have surveillance cameras? 
i. Are they recording at all times? 
ii. Where are they located 
iii. How long is footage saved? 
d. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
e. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
4. Staff 
a. Do staff undergo security trainings? 
i. If yes, how frequently? 
ii. If no, why not? 
b. Does the institution conduct background checks on potential hires? 
c. Is staff performance formally evaluated in any way? 
d. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
e. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
5. Researchers 
a. Are researchers required to register before being able to access material? 
i. If yes, what information is collected? 
1. Is a photo ID required? 
2. For how long is information kept? 
ii. If no, why not? 
b. Are researchers required to fill out call slips to see material? 
i. If yes, for how long are call slips kept? 
ii. If no, why not? 
c. Are researchers instructed on institutional security policies, rules for 
handling materials? 
i. If yes, are the required to sign a legal document to verify? 
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1. Are there any repercussions if they fail to follow the rules? 
ii. If no, why not? 
d. Are researchers limited in what they can bring into the reading room? 
i. If yes, what is allowed? What is not allowed? 
ii. If no, why not? 
e. Are researchers supervised in the reading room? 
i. If yes, is this consistent? 
ii. If no, why not? 
f. Are researchers limited in how many materials they can use at once? 
i. If yes, what is the limit? 
ii. If no, why not? 
g. Are materials evaluated before and after being used by a researcher? 
i. If yes, how are they evaluated? 
ii. If no, why not? 
h. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
i. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
6. Classrooms 
a. Does your archive have classroom spaces? If yes: 
b. Are sessions supervised? 
i. If no, why not? 
c. Do you keep a list of participants? 
i. If yes, for how long is this information saved? 
ii. If no, why not? 
d. Are students limited in what they can bring into the classroom? 
i. If yes, what is allowed? What is not allowed? 
ii. If no, why not? 
e. Are students limited in what they can touch and interact with? 
i. If yes, what is allowed? What is not allowed? 
ii. If no, why not? 
f. Are materials evaluated before and after a class? 
i. If yes, how are they evaluated? 
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ii. If no, why not? 
g. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
h. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
7. The Collections 
a. Are collections documented well enough to establish proof of ownership? 
i. Do you create condition reports, detailed catalog records, etc.? 
ii. If no, why not? 
b. Are items marked in any way with an identifying symbol unique to your 
archive? 
i. If no, why not? 
c. Are the most valuable or vulnerable items housed in a more secure area? 
i. If yes, how are these items identified? 
ii. If no, why not? 
d. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
e. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
8. Record-Keeping, Description, and Cataloging 
a. Are regular inventories conducted in your archive? 
i. If yes, how frequently? 
ii. If no, why not? 
b. Do you have a shelf list? 
i. If no, why not? 
c. Does your archive keep records of unlocated items? 
i. If yes, are they rechecked regularly? 
1. For how long must an item be on an unlocated list before it 
is determined to be missing? 
d. Does your archive keep deaccession records? 
i. If yes, for how long are these records saved? 
ii. If no, why not? 
e. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
f. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
9. Legal and Procedural Responsibilities 
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a. Are staff trained in how to prevent a possible theft while observing a 
suspect’s rights? 
b. Are/would thefts be promptly reported to law enforcement? 
i. If no, why not? 
c. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
d. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
10. Institutional and Legislative Support 
a. Does/would your archive support law enforcement in the prosecution of 
accused thieves? 
i. If yes, in what ways? 
ii. If no, why not? 
b. Do you think these are effective security measures? 
c. Do you think these are practical security measures? 
 
